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1 Introduction
Belief revision traditionally deals — from a first person perspective — with the
question of what an agent should believe given an initial state and a revision
input. This question is approached in two main ways: (i) formulating general
properties a belief revision operator should satisfy and (ii) constructing specific
revision operators. In this paper, we want to give a brief overview over our
investigations of what we can say about another agent’s actual beliefs based on
an observation of its belief revision behaviour. This issue is discussed in detail in
the first author’s PhD thesis [9] and in a number of (joint) papers [2,3,4,10,11].
The observed agent will be denoted by A and we work in a propositional lan-
guage L. We make a number of simplifying assumptions. A employs a particular
belief revision framework introduced in [1]. It can be seen as a non-prioritised
version of Nayak’s lexicographic revision [7] and is also closely related to Nebel’s
linear revision [8]. Further, we are interested only in propositional beliefs, that
is, we will not deal with higher order beliefs. The information about A is given as
an observation o containing the revision inputs received during a period of time
and a partial description of beliefs held and not held after receiving an input.
We are interested in the following questions. Which inputs are accepted by
A and which are rejected? (This need not be explicitly given in the observation.)
What did A believe before the observation started? What did it believe during
the time of observation apart from what o already tells us? What will A believe
after receiving some further input(s)?
The general method is to construct a potential initial epistemic state of the
agent and progress the inputs recorded in the observation starting in that state
in order to generate hypotheses about the beliefs. We call a state an explanation
if it verifies the information contained in the observation. There are generally
many possible explanations and one of the tasks is to single out a good one.
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2 Belief revision framework, observation, and rational
explanation
Definition 1. The epistemic state [ρ,N] of an agent consists of a sequence of
formulae ρ and a formula N. N is called the agent’s core belief. The revision
operator ∗ is defined for any epistemic state [ρ,N] and formula ϕ by setting
[ρ,N] ∗ ϕ = [ρ · ϕ,N]. The belief set Bel([ρ,N]) in any epistemic state [ρ,N] is
Bel([ρ,N]) = Cn(f (ρ · N)), where
f (βk, . . . , β1) =

β1 , k = 1
βk ∧ f (βk−1, . . . , β1) , k > 1 and βk ∧ f (βk−1, . . . , β1) 6` ⊥
f (βk−1, . . . , β1) , otherwise
The agent’s epistemic state [ρ,N] is made up of two components: (i) a se-
quence ρ of formulae and (ii) a single formula N, all formulae being elements
of L. N stands for the agent’s set of core beliefs — the beliefs of the agent it
considers “untouchable” and commits to at all times. One main effect of N is
that revision inputs contradicting it will not be accepted into the belief set. ρ is
a record of the agent’s revision history. Iterated revision is handled quite nat-
urally. All revision steps are simply recorded and the problem of what A is to
believe after each revision step, in particular whether the input just received
is accepted, i.e., is believed, is deferred to the calculation of the beliefs in an
epistemic state. The agent’s full set of beliefs Bel([ρ,N]) in the state [ρ,N] is
determined by a particular calculation on ρ and N which uses the function f
mapping a sequence σ of propositional formulae to a formula. The agent starts
with its core belief N and then goes backwards through ρ, adding a formula as
an additional conjunct if the resulting formula is consistent. If it is not, then the
formula is simply ignored and the next element of ρ is considered. The belief set
of A then is the set of logical consequences of the formula thus constructed.
Definition 2. An observation o = 〈(ϕ1, θ1, D1), . . . , (ϕn, θn, Dn)〉 is a sequence
of triples (ϕi, θi, Di), where for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n: ϕi, θi, and all δ ∈ Di (Di is finite)
are elements of a finitely generated propositional language L. [ρ,N] explains o
(or is an explanation for o) if and only if the following two conditions hold.
1. N 6` ⊥
2. for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n :
Bel([ρ,N] ∗ ϕ1 ∗ · · · ∗ ϕi) ` θi and
∀δ ∈ Di : Bel([ρ,N] ∗ ϕ1 ∗ · · · ∗ ϕi) 6` δ
We say N is an o-acceptable core iff [ρ,N] explains o for some ρ.
The intuitive interpretation of an observation is as follows. After having re-
ceived the revision inputs ϕ1 up to ϕi starting in some initial epistemic state, A
believed at least θi but did not believe any element of Di. Unless stated other-
wise, we assume that during the time of the observation A received exactly the
revision inputs recorded in o, in particular we assume that no input was received
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between ϕi and ϕi+1, the observation being correct and complete in that sense.
For the θi and Di we assume the observation to be correct but possibly partial,
i.e., the agent did indeed believe θi and did not believe any δ ∈ Di, but there
may be formulae ψ for which nothing is known. Note that complete ignorance
about what the agent believed after a certain revision step can be represented
by θi = > and complete ignorance about what was not believed by Di = ∅.
An explanation of a given observation o is an epistemic state that verifies
the information in o and has a consistent core belief. There are infinitely many
explanations in case o can be explained. This is why our proposed method for
reasoning about A is to choose one explanation. A very important property
of the framework is that A’s beliefs after several revision steps starting in an
initial state can equivalently be expressed as the beliefs after a single revision on
the same initial state: Bel([ρ,N] ∗ ϕ1 ∗ · · · ∗ ϕi) = Bel([ρ,N] ∗ f (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N)).
Intuitively, the agent merges its core belief and all revision inputs received using
f into a single formula and then conditions its epistemic state using it. This
allows us to translate the observation into information about a single state —
the initial epistemic state we are after. Note however, that N needs to be known as
otherwise f (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N) cannot be calculated. So, given a core belief N, o yields
that A would believe θi (and would not believe any δ ∈ Di) in case it revised its
initial epistemic state by f (ϕ1, . . . , ϕi,N). This is nothing but conditional beliefs
held and not held by A in its initial state [ρ,N]. That is, o is a partial description
of A’s conditional beliefs in [ρ,N]. The above equation also entails that if we had
a full description of its conditional beliefs we could calculate the beliefs after any
sequence of revision inputs, enabling us to answer the questions we posed in the
introduction. It turns out that the assumed belief revision framework allows us to
apply existing work ([6] and in particular [5]) on completing partial information
about conditional beliefs and to construct a suitable ρ such that [ρ,N] is indeed
an explanation for o in case N is o-acceptable. An iterative refinement of the core
belief guarantees that an explanation, which we call the rational explanation, is
found in case there is one.
The set of o-acceptable cores is closed under disjunction. We showed the ratio-
nal explanation to satisfy a number of desirable properties, e.g., that it yields the
logically weakest o-acceptable core and that the beliefs calculated satisfy a partic-
ular minimality property. However, not all conclusions drawn about A based on
the rational explanation need to be correct. This is clear as any other explanation
for o might correspond to the agent’s true initial state. We suggested hypothet-
ical reasoning for verifying conclusions. The basic idea is to modify the original
observation o in a way such that an explanation for o′, which also explains o,
would be a counterexample to the conclusion we want to verify. For example,
assume that the rational explanation for o = 〈(ϕ1, θ1, D1), . . . , (ϕn, θn, Dn)〉 tells
us that after receiving ϕi the agent believes ψ (which is not entailed by θi). If
we now replace the entry (ϕi, θi, Di) in o by (ϕi, θi, Di ∪ {ψ}), the resulting ob-
servation o′ expresses that after receiving ϕi the agent does not believe ψ. So
in case o′ has an explanation — which can be tested by calculating the rational
explanation of o′ — the original conclusion is not safe.
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3 Unknown logical content, missing revision inputs, etc.
The assumption that o contains exactly those inputs received by A excludes
cases where the logical content of the inputs is only partially known or some
inputs may have been missed by the observer. However, the original methods
can be extended in order to deal with such cases as well. The idea is to allow
any formula in o to contain unknown subformulae which are represented by place
holders χj . The formula p∧χ1, for example, could represent a revision input that
entails p. If the same χj appears in several places, this may carry information
that can be exploited although the observer does not know the actual formula.
The method for dealing with this type of observation is as follows. Each χj
is replaced by a new variable xj , transforming an observation with unknown
subformulae into a normal one. Now, the rational explanation construction can
be applied. We showed that this transformation preserves explanations in the
following sense. If there is an explanation for some instantiation of the χj then
there is also one when using new variables. Conversely, if there is no explanation
when using new variables xj for the χj then no explanation exists using any
instantiation of the unknown subformulae. Reasoning about A is then done by
considering the rational explanation of the observation using new variables xj
but restricting the conclusions to the language constructed from those variables
appearing in the observation, i.e., excluding the xj .
This does not allow for missing inputs, yet. Note that the transformed ob-
servation is assumed to contain an entry for every input received by A. These
entries can be introduced into the observation by adding a new triple (χj ,>, ∅)
for every revision input that may have been missed. This entry states that A
received a revision input whose logical content is completely unknown and we
have no information about what it believed or did not believe upon receiving
that input. Of course, this methodology is problematic as we may not know
how many inputs were missed at which position in the observation. However,
we can provide results that limit the number of additional inputs that need
to be assumed, depending on which information about number and positions
of the missing inputs is available to the observer. The hypothetical reasoning
methodology can still be applied.
Extending the work in a yet different direction, it is also possible to construct
an initial state that explains several observations in the sense that different re-
vision sequences start in the same state. This is reasonable, e.g., when thinking
about an expert reasoning about different cases (the initial state representing
the expert’s background knowledge) or identical copies of software agents being
exposed to different situations. Our work is focused on reasoning using observa-
tions of other agents, but observing oneself can be useful as well. By keeping an
observation of itself an agent may reason about what other agents can conclude
about it, which is important when trying to keep certain information secret.
The results can also be applied for slight variations of the assumed belief revi-
sion framework. For example, it is possible to allow the core belief to be revised
or to relax the restriction that new inputs are always appended to the end of ρ
in an epistemic state [ρ,N].
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